The idea of applying machine learning(ML) to solve problems in security domains is almost 3 decades old. As information and communications grow more ubiquitous and more data become available, many security risks arise as well as appetite to manage and mitigate such risks. Consequently, research on applying and designing ML algorithms and systems for security has grown fast, ranging from intrusion detection systems(IDS) and malware classification to security policy management(SPM) and information leak checking. In this paper, we systematically study the methods, algorithms, and system designs in academic publications from 2008-2015 that applied ML in security domains. 98% of the surveyed papers appeared in the 6 highest-ranked academic security conferences and 1 conference known for pioneering ML applications in security. We examine the generalized system designs, underlying assumptions, measurements, and use cases in active research. Our examinations lead to 1) a taxonomy on ML paradigms and security domains for future exploration and exploitation, and 2) an agenda detailing open and upcoming challenges. Based on our survey, we also suggest a point of view that treats security as a game theory problem instead of a batch-trained ML problem.
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Since Dorothy Denning's seminal 1987 paper on intrusion detection [1] , ML and data mining(DM) have steadily gained attention in security applications. DARPA's 1998 network intrusion detection evaluation [2] , and KDD(Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining) Cup's 1999 challenge [3, 4] have raised profile of ML in security contexts. Yet, constrained by hardware and system resources[4], largescale ML applications did not receive much attention for many years. * Corresponding authors
In 2008, ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security(CCS) hosted the 1st Artificial Intelligence in Security(AISec) Workshop, which has since been a dedicated venue at a top-level security conference for the intersection of ML and security. From 2008, the pace of research and publicity of ML in security started to accelerate in academic communities (section 2.3), and industry venues (e.g. Black Hat, RSA) also shifted interests. For instance, ML in security was still a topic of minority interest at Black Hat USA 2014 in August [5] , but at RSA 2016 in February, the majority of vendors claimed to deploy ML in their products [6] . A part of this shift may be motivated by the sudden increase in blackswan events like the discovery of CRIME, BEAST and Heartbleed vulnerabilities. The discovery of these vulnerabilities suggest that organizations may be attacked via previously unknown classes of attacks. To defend against these types of attacks requires monitoring not just for known vectors attacks, but also for behavior suggestive of a compromised machine. The latter requires the gathering and analysis of much larger sets of data.
Advances in hardware and data processing capacities enabled large-scale systems. With increasing amount of data from growing numbers of information channels and devices, the analytic tools and intelligent behaviors provided by ML becomes increasingly important in security. With DARPA's Cyber Grand Challenge final contest looming [7] , research interest in ML and security is becoming even more conspicuous. Now is the crucial time to examine research works done in ML applications and security. To do so, we studied the state-of-art of ML research in security between 2008 and early 2016, and systematize this research area in 3 ways:
Figure 1: Generalization of surveyed ML System Designs in Security; details in section 2.1 combination of specific use cases(e.g. malware, phishing), technique (e.g. information flow), and targeted assets(e.g. web application, proxies). We present the state-of-art ML applications in security as the following: Section 3 and Table  2 & 3 discusses Network Security 1 , Section 4 and Table 4 surveys Security Services, Section 5 and Table 5 specifies advances in Software & Applications Security, Section 6 and Table 6 & 7 lays out taxonomy for System Security, and Section 7 and Table 8, 9 & 10 summarizes progress since 2008 in Malware Detection, IDS, and Social Engineering. Throughout the survey, we share our frameworks for ML system designs, assumptions, and algorithm deployments in security.
We focus our survey on security applications and securityrelated ML and AI problems on the defense side, hence our scope excludes theories related to security such as differential privacy and privacy-preservation in ML algorithms [9, 10, 11] , and excludes ML applications in side channel attacks such as [12, 13, 14] . Partly because there is already a 2013 SoK on evolution of Sybil defense [15] in online social networks(OSN), and partly because we would like to leave it as a small exercise to our readers, we excluded Sybil defense schemes in OSN as well [16, 17, 18, 19, 20] . Still with a broad base, we propose an alternative position to frame security issues, and we also recommend a taxonomy for ML applications in security use cases. Yet, we do not conclude with a terminal list of "right" or "correct" approaches or methods. We believe that the range of the applications is too wide to fit into one singular use case or analysis framework. Instead, we intend this paper as a systematic design and method overview of thinking about researching and developing ML algorithms and applications, that will guide researchers in their problem domains on an individual basis. We target our work to security researchers and practitioners, so we assume that our readers have general knowledge for key security domains and awareness of common ML algorithms, and we also define terms when needed.
We agree with assessment of top conferences in [21] 2 . We systematically went through all proceedings between 2008 and early 2016 of the top 6 network-and computer-security conferences to collect relevant papers. Because of KDD's early and consistent publication record on ML applications in Security, and its status as a top-level venue for ML and DM applications, we also include KDD's 2008-2015 proceedings. To demonstrate the wide-ranging research attention drawn to ML applications in security, we also added chosen selections from the workshop AISec, International Conference on Machine Learning(ICML), Neural Information Processing Systems(NIPS), and Internet Measurement Conference(IMC) papers between 2008-2015, mostly in the "Future Development" section. Figure 1 shows the generalization of ML system designs when applied in security, that emerged from our survey of the papers(the legend is on the figure's bottom left). In different use cases, the system components may embody different names, but their functionalities and positions are captured in the figure. For example:
ML System Designs in Security
1. Knowledge base is baseline of known normality and/or abnormality, depending on use cases, they include but are not limited to blacklist(BL), whitelist(WL), watchlist; known malware signatures, system traces, and their families; initial set of malicious web pages; existing security policies or rules, etc.. 2. Data sources are where relevant data is collected.
They can be either off-line or live online data feed, e.g. malware traces collected after execution(off-line), URL stream(online). 3. Training data are labeled data which are fed to classifiers in training. They can be standard research datasets, new data(mostly from industry) labeled by human, synthetic datasets, or a mix. 4. Pre-processor and feature extractor construct features from data sources, for example: URL aggregators, graph representations, SMTP header extractions, n-gram model builders.
conf_stat.htm, and (3) Jianying Zhou -Top Crypto and Security Conferences Ranking http://icsd.i2r.a-star. edu.sg/staff/jianying/conference-ranking.html. All 3 rankings have the same top 6, and because Crypto and Eurocrypt do not have papers within our focus, we decided on these 4: ACM CCS, IEEE S&P(hereafter "SP"), NDSS, and USENIX Security(hereafter "Sec" or "USENIX") Dynamic analyzer and static analyzer are used most often in malware-related ML tasks, and human feedback loop is added when the system's design intends to be semi-supervised or human-in-the-loop(HITL). Table 1 shows a matrix with rows indicating different ways of classifying the security problems, and the columns showing well-understood ML paradigms. Based on the threat models and modeling purposes presented in the papers, we qualitatively group the attacker into three groups. If there are multiple attacker types in one section, the section's numbering appears multiple times accordingly.
ML Paradigms in Security Problems
1. Passive attackers make no attempt to evade detections; their behaviors fit into descriptions of the threat models. 2. Semi-aggressive attackers have knowledge of the detectors, and only attempt to evade detections. 3. Active attackers do not only have knowledge of the detectors and attempt to evade detections, but also actively try to poison, mislead, or thwart detection. 4. Knowledge of attackers, is the information in at least one of the five aspects: the learning algorithms themselves, the algorithms' feature spaces, the algorithm's parameters, training and evaluation data -regardless of being labeled or not -used by the algorithms, and decision feedback given by the algorithms [23, 24, 25] .
Influenced by [22, 23] , we extend their definitions, and qualitatively categorize attackers' primary purpose as to compromise confidentiality, availability or integrity of legitimate systems, services, and users.
1. Attacks on confidentiality compromise the confidential or secret information of systems, services, or users (e.g. password crackers). 2. Attacks on availability make systems and services unusable with unwanted information, requests, or many errors in defense schemes (e.g. DDoS, spam). 3. Attacks on integrity masquerade maliciously intentions as benign intentions in systems, services, and users (e.g. malware).
We also define ML paradigms shown in the matrix:
1. Supervised learning uses labeled data for training. 2. Semi-supervised learning uses both labeled and unlabeled data for training. 3. Unsupervised learning has no labeled data available for training. 4. Human-in-the-loop(HITL) learning incorporates active human feedback to algorithm's decisions into the knowledge base and/or algorithms. 5. Game Theory(GT)-based learning considers learning as a series of strategic interactions between the model learner and actors with conflicting goals. The actors can be data generators, feature generators, chaotic human actors, or a combination [23, 24, 26, 27, 28] .
For "Means of Attacks" in Table 1 , server, network, and user are straightforward and intuitive, so here we only describe "client app" and "client machine". Client app is any browser-based means of attack on any client device, and client machine is any non-browser-based means of attack on any client device.
As shown in Table 1 , the majority of surveyed papers in different security domains use supervised learning to deal with passive or semi-aggressive attackers. However, the core requirement of supervised learning -labeled data -is not always viable or easy to obtain, and authors have repeatedly written about the difficulty of obtaining labeled data for training. Based on this observation, we conclude that exploring semi-supervised and unsupervised learning approaches would expand the research foundation of ML applications in security domains, because semi-supervised and unsupervised learning can utilize unlabeled datasets which had not been used by supervised learning approaches before.
Moreover, during our survey, we realized that many ML applications in security assume that training and testing data come from the same distribution (in statistical terms, this is the assumption of stationarity). However, in the real world, it is highly unlikely that data are stationary, let alone that the data could very well be generated by an adversarial data generator producing training and/or testing data sets, as the case in [26] , or simply be generated responding to specific models as in [29] . Our observation from the comprehensive survey confirmed [23] 's statement, and we propose that GT-based learning approaches and HITL learning system designs should be explored more, in order to design more efficient security defense mechanisms to deal with active and unpredictable adversaries. At the same time, human knowledge and judgment in HTIL should go beyond feature engineering, to providing feedback to decisions made by ML models. Some theory-leaning papers have modeled spam filtering as Bayesian games or Stackelberg games [26, 29] . Use cases in data sampling, model training with poisoned or low-confidence data have also been briefly explored in literature [27, 30, 31] .
Timeline of ML in Security
Based on seminal works and establishments in notable venues, the gradually increasing levels of interest in ML research applied to Security is fairly visible. Here we gathered some milestone events: 
NETWORK SECURITY 3.1 Botnets and Honeypots
Research works on botnets among our surveyed literature focuses mainly on designing systems to detect commandand-control(C&C) botnets, where many bot-infected machines are controlled and coordinated by few entities to carry out malicious activities [47, 48, 49] . Those systems need to learn decision boundaries between human and bot activities, therefore ML-based classifiers are at the core of those systems, and are often trained by labeled data in supervised learning environments. The most popular classifier is support vector machines(SVMs) with different kernels, while spatial-temporal time series analysis and probabilistic inferences are also notable techniques employed in ML-based classifiers. Topic clustering, mostly seen in natural language processing(NLP), is used to build a large-scale system to identify bot queries [50] . In botnet detection literature, 3 core assumptions are widely shared:
1. Botnet protocols are mostly C&C [47, 48, 51] 2. Individual bots within same botnets behave similarly and can be correlated to each other [51, 52] 3. Botnet behaviors are different and distinguishable from legitimate human user, e.g. human behaviors are more complex [53, 54, 55] Other stronger assumptions include that bots and humans interact with different server groups [56] , and content features from messages generated by bots and human are independent [53] . While classification techniques differ, WLs, BLs, hypothesis testing, and a classifier [47, 49, 53] are usual system components. Attempts have been made to abstract state machine models of network to simulate realworld network traffic and create honeypots [57] . Ground truths are often heuristic [52] , labeled by human experts, or a combination -even at large scale, human labeled ground truths are used, for example in [55] , game masters' visual inspections serve as ground truth to detect bots in online games. In retrospect, the evolution of botnet detection is clear: from earlier and more straightforward uses of classification techniques such as clustering and NB, the research focus has expanded from the last step of classification, to the important preceding step of constructing suitable metrics, that measures and distinguishes bot-based and humanbased activities [50, 55] .
Proxies and DNS
Classifying DNS domains that distribute or host malware, scams, and malicious content has drawn research interest especially in passive DNS analysis. There are two main approaches: reputation system [58, 59, 60] and classifier [61, 62] . Reputation system scores benign and malicious domains and DNS hosts, and a ML-based classifier learns boundaries between the two. Nonetheless, both reputation system and classifier use various decision trees, random forest(RF), naïve Bayes(NB), SVM, and clustering techniques for mostly supervised learning-based scoring and classification. Many features used are from protocols and network infrastructures, e.g. border gateway protocol(BGP) and updates, automated systems(AS), registration, zone, hosts, and public BLs. Similar to botnet detectors, variations of BL, WL, and honeypots [63] are used in similar functions as knowledge bases, while ground truths are often taken from public BLs, limited WLs, and anti-virus(AV) vendors such as McAfee and Norton [58, 59, 61] . But before any ML attempts take place, most studies would assume the following:
1. Malicious uses of DNS are distinct and distinguishable from legitimate DNS services. 2. The data collection process -regardless of different names such as data flow, traffic recorder, or packet assembler -follows a centralized model. In other words, all the traffic/data/packets flow through certain central node or nodes to be collected.
Stronger assumptions include that AS hijackers cannot manipulate AS path before it reaches them [60] , and maliciousness will trigger an accurate IP address classifier to fail [64] . Besides analyzing the status quo, [64, 65, 66] showed efforts to preemptively protect network measurement integrity and predict potentially malicious activities from web domains and IP address spaces. [72, 74, 75] , and uncovering anonymity [76, 77, 78, 79] are 4 major use cases. On the offense, specialized ML domains such as computer vision, signal processing, and NLP automate attacks on user authentication services i.e. textual or visual passwords and CAPTCHAs, and uncover hidden identities and services. On the defense side, entropy-based and ML-based systems calculate password strengths. Other than traditional user authentication schemes, behavioral metrics of users are also introduced. Following the generalized ML pipeline shown in Figure 1 , the "classifier" is replaced by "recognition engine" in the password cracking process, and "user differentiation engine" in authentic metric engineering [80, 81] . Hence the process becomes: "Data source → Pre-process & feature extraction → Recognition or user differentiation engine → Decision" for ML-based security services. A noteworthy trend to observe, is that attacks on CAPTCHAs are getting more generalized -from utilizing SVM in 2008 to attack a specific type of text CAPTCHA [67] , in 2015 a generic attach approach to attack text-based CAPTCHA [70] was proposed.
SECURITY SERVICES
ML-based attacks on textual and visual CAPTCHA typically follow the 4-step process:
1. Segmentation: e.g. signal to noise ratio(SNR) for audio; hue, color, value(HSV) for visual [67, 69, 70 , 82] 2. Signal or image representation: e.g. discrete Fourier transformation(audio) [82] , letter binarization(visual) [70] 3. Feature extraction: e.g. spectro-temporal features, character strokes [67, 82] 4. Recognition: K-nearest neighbor(KNN), SVM(RBF kernel), convolutional neural networks(CNN) [68, 71] On the side of password-related topics in security services, there are 2 password models: whole-string Markov models, and template-based models [73] . Concepts in statistical language modeling, such as natural language encoder and ngrams associated with Markov models(presented as directed graphs with nodes labeled by n-grams), and context-free grammars are common probabilistic foundations to build password strength meters and password crackers [71, 72, 82] .
SOFTWARE & APPLICATION SECURITY
ML research in software and applications security mostly concentrate on web application security in our survey, and have used supervised learning to train popular classifiers such as NB and SVM to detect web-based malware and JavaScript(JS) code [83, 84] , filter unwanted resources and requests such as malicious advertisements [85, 86, 87, 88] , predict unwanted resources and requests(e.g. future blacklisted websites) [89, 90, 91] , and quantify web application vulnerabilities [92] . While [91] explored building web application anomaly detector with scarce training data, most use cases follow the supervised paradigm assuming plentiful labeled data: Data source(web applications, static/dynamic analyzers) → feature extraction(often with specific pre-filter, metrics, and de-obfuscator if needed) → classifiers trained with labeled data. Apart from this supervised setting, if a human expert's feedback is added after classifiers' decisions [85] , it forms a semi-supervised system. Regardless of system designs, the usual assumption holds: malicious activities or actors are different from normal and benign ones likely do not change much. The knowledge bases of normality and abnormality can vary, from historical regular expression lists [86] to other publicly available detectors [84] . Graphbased algorithms [87] and image recognition [90] are both used in resource filtering, but in detecting JS malware and evasions and quantifying leaks, having suitable measurements of similarities is a significant focal point. Indeed, from [83, 84, 92] , ML-based classifiers do well in finding similarities between mutated malicious code snippets, while the same code pieces could evade static or dynamic analyzer detections.
6. SYSTEM SECURITY 6.1 Vulnerability and Policy Management
As Landwehr noticed [93] , ML can be applied in SPM. However, in automatic fingerprinting of operating systems(OS), C4.5 decision tree, SVM, RF, KNN -some most commonly used ML-based classifiers in security -failed to distinguish remote machine instances with coarse-and fine-grained differences, as the algorithms cannot exploit semantic knowledge of protocols or send multi-packet probes [94] . Yet by taking advantage of semantic and syntactic features, plus semi-supervised system design, [95, 96, 97] showed that SVM(optimized by sequential minimal optimization[SMO] algorithm), KNN, and NLP techniques do well in Android SPM. On the other hand, in vulnerability management, [98, 99, 100, 101, 102] , clustering techniques have done well in predicting future incidents and infer vulnerability patterns in code, as well as NB, SVM, and RF in ranking risks and identifying proper permission levels. Both vulnerability management and SPM also focus on devising proper metrics for ML applications: from heuristics based on training set [100] , Jaro distance [101] , to outside reputation system oracles [99] , metrics are needed to compare dependency graphs, string similarities, and inferred vulnerability patterns. In most use cases, because of the need for labeled data to train supervised learning systems, many systems follow the generalized training process in Figure 1 : "Knowledge base → offline trainer → online or offline classifier". When policy management decisions need feedback, a HITL design is in place where end human users' feedback is directed to knowledge base. One distinguishing tradition in ML applications research in this domain, is a strong emphasis on measurement -selecting or engineering proper similarity or scoring metrics are often important points of discussion in research literature. From earlier uses of heuristics in clustering algorithms, to more recent semantic connectivity measurement applied in semisupervised systems, both the metrics and the system designs for vulnerability and security policy management have evolved to not only identify, but also to infer and predict future vulnerable instances.
Information Flow and DDoS
Compared to other security domains, ML research in information flow and DDoS focus more on evasion tactics and limits of ML systems in adversarial environments. Hence we grouped together the two sub-domains, and marked studies in Table 7 with "(IF)" and "(DDoS)" accordingly. For DDoS [27, 103, 104] , the usual assumption is that patterns of attack and abuse traffic are different from normal traffic [103] , but [104] challenged it by proposing an adversary who can generate attributes that look as plausible as actual attributes in benign patterns, and caused failure in ML-based automated signature generation to distinguish benign and malicious byte sequences. Then, [27] introduced GT to evaluate DDoS attack and defense in real-world. For information flow [24, 105, 106, 107] , assumptions can take various forms. In PDF classifiers based on document structural features, it is malicious PDF has different document structures than good PDFs [105] ; in Android privacy leak detector, it is the majority of an Android application's semantically similar peers has similar privacy disclosure scenarios [106] . But [24] poses semi-aggressive and active attackers with some information about the data, feature sets, and/or algorithms, and then attackers successfully evade ML-based PDF classifiers. Another example is, PDF malware could be classified [105] , and then a generic and automated evasion technique based on genetic programming is successfully experimented [107] . Overall, while using SVM, RF, and decision trees trained with labeled data to detect and predict DDoS and malicious information and data flows, ML applications in information flow and DDoS challenge the usual assumption of stationary adversary behaviors. From collecting local information only, to proposing a general game theory-based framework to evaluate DDoS attacks and defense, and from using static method to detect malicious PDF file to generic automated evasion, the scope of ML applications in both DDoS and IF have expanded and generalized over the years.
MALWARE, SOCIAL ENGINEERING & IDS

Malware Detection and Mitigations
Program-centric or system-centric, there are 3 areas that draw most ML application research attention in malware: malware detection [108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119] , classifying unknown malware into families [31, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124] , and auto-extract program or protocol specifications [125, 126, 127] . Realizing the signature and heuristic-based malware detectors can be evaded by obfuscation and polymorphism [118] , more behavior-based matching and clustering systems and algorithms have been researched. Figure 1 already shows a generalized ML system design for malware detection and classification, and a more detailed description is below: Even in the use case of auto-extract specifications, supervised learning with labeled data is needed when behavior profiles, state machine inferences, fuzzing, and message clustering are present. Evasion techniques of detectors and poisoning of ML algorithms are also discussed, and typical evasion techniques include obfuscation, polymorphism, mimicry, and reflecting set generation [24, 113] . Malware detection and matching based on structural information and behavior profiles [118, 120, 124] show a tendency to use graph-based clustering and detection algorithms, and similarity measurement used in these algorithms have ranged from Jaccard distance to new graph-based matching metrics. While clustering techniques have been mostly used in malware detection, a nearest neighbor technique is explored to evade malware detection.
Social Engineering: Phishing, Malicious Content and Behaviors
Spams, malicious webpages and URLs that redirect or mislead un-suspecting users to malware, scams, or adult content [66] is perhaps as old as civilian use of the Internet.
Research literature mostly focus on 3 major areas: detecting phishing malicious URLs [128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133] , filtering spam or fraudulent content [26, 29, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141] , and detecting malicious user account behaviors [142, 143, 144, 145, 146] . Moreover, because phishing 4 is a classic social engineering tactic, it is often the gateway of many studies to detect malicious URLs, spam, and fraudulent content. To identify malicious URLs, MLbased classifiers draw features from webpage content(lexical, visual, etc.), URL lexical features, redirect paths, host-based features, or some combinations of them. Such classifiers usually act in conjunction with knowledge bases which are usually in-browser URL BLs or from web service providers. If the classifier is fed with URL-based features, it is common to set an URL aggregator as a pre-processor before extracting features. Mostly using supervised learning paradigm, NB, SVM with different kernels, and LR are popular ML classifiers for filtering spam and phishing. Meanwhile, GTbased learning to deal with active attackers is also evaluated in spam filtering. [26] evaluates a Bayesian game model where the defense is not fully informed of the attacker's objectives and the active adversary can exercise control over data generation, [29] proposes a Stackelberg game where spammer reacts to the learner's moves. Stronger assumptions also exist: for example, [139] assumes spammers' phone blocks follow a beta distribution as conjugate prior for Bernoulli and binomial distribution. Another social engineering tactic is spoofing identities with fake or compromised user accounts, and detection of such malicious behaviors utilize features from user profiles, spatial-, temporal-, and spatial-temporal patterns, and user profiles are used in particular to construct normality. Graph representation and trust propagation models are also deployed to distinguish genuine and malicious accounts with different behavior and representations [144, 145, 146] . Tracing the chronology of applying ML to defend against social engineering, one trend is clear: while content-, lexical-, and syntactic-based features are still being widely used, constructing graph representations and exploring temporal patterns of redirect paths, events, accounts, and behaviors have been on the rise as feature spaces for ML applications in defend against social engineering efforts. Accordingly, the ML techniques have also changed from different classification schemes to graphic models. It is also noteworthy that in [29, 146] , addressing adversarial environments' challenges to ML systems is elaborated as primary research areas, instead of a short discussion point.
IDS
From feature sets to algorithms and systems, IDS has been extensively studied. However, as [147] cautioned, ML can be easily conflated with anomaly detection. While both are applied to build IDS, important difference is that ML aims to generalize expert-defined distinctions, but anomaly detection focuses on finding unusual patterns, while attacks are not necessarily anomalous. For example, [148] distinguished n-gram model's different use cases: anomaly detection uses it to construct normality(hence more appropriate when no attack is available for learning), and ML classifiers learn to discriminate between benign and malicious n-grams(hence more appropriate when more labeled data is present). Since 2008, works at top venues have added to the rigor for ML applications in IDS. For example, a common assumption of IDS is: Anomalous or malicious behaviors or traffic flows are fundamentally different from normal ones, but [147] challenges the assumption by studying low-cardinality intrusions where attackers don't send a large number of probes. To address adversarial learning environment and minimal labels in training data, semisupervised paradigms, especially active learning, are also used [147, 149] . Heterogeneous designs of IDS in different use cases give rise to many ad-hoc evaluations in research works, and a reproducibility and comparison framework was proposed to address the issue [150] . Meanwhile, techniques such as graph-based community detection [151] , time series-based methods [152, 153] , and generalized support vector data description in cyber-physical system and adversarial environment for auto-feature selection [154] , have also emerged. Although they carry different assumptions of normality and feature representations, the supervised ML system design remains largely the same. Besides the fact the more techniques and use cases have been proposed, the focus of research in IDS had evolved from discovering new techniques and use cases, to rigorously evaluating fundamental assumptions and workflows of IDS. For example, while feature selection has stayed as a major component, there are re-examination of assumptions and measurements on what constitutes normality and abnormality [151] , alternative to more easily acquire data and use low-confidence data for ML systems [149] , and proposal on validating reproducibility of results from different settings [150] .
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
One key goal of our SoK survey is to help researchers look into the future. ML applications in security domains are attracting academic research attention as well as industrial interest, and this presents a valuable opportunity for researchers to navigate the landscapes between ML theories and security applications. There are also opportunities to explore if there are some types of ML paradigms that are especially well suited to particular security problems. Apart from highlighting that 1) semi-supervised and unsupervised ML paradigms are more effective in utilizing unlabeled data, hence ease the difficulty of obtaining labeled data, and 2) GT-based ML paradigms and HITL ML system designs will become more influential in dealing with semi-aggressive and aggressive attackers, we also share the following seven speculations of future trends, based on our current SoK.
1. Metric Learning: Measurement has become more and more conspicuous for ML research in security, mostly in similarity measurement for clustering algorithms [53, 65, 76, 120] . Proper measurements and metrics are also used to construct ground truths to evaluate ML-based classifiers, and also have important roles in feature engineering [55, 140, 155, 156] . Given the ubiquitous presence of metrics and the complex nature of constructing them, ML applications in security will benefit much from metric learning. 2. NLP: Malicious content, spam, and malware analysis and detections have used tools from statistical language modeling(e.g. n-gram-based representation for strings in code and HTTP request) [62, 74, 116, 138, 141, 157] , As textual information explodes, NLP will become more widely used beyond source filtering and clustering e.g. [57] use n-gram models to infer state machines of protocols. 3. Upstream movement of ML in security defense designs. In malware detection and classifications, behaviorand signature-based malware classifiers have used inputs from static and dynamic binary analysis as features [110, 111, 123, 126] , and [112] already shows RNN can be applied to automatically recognize functions in binary analysis. We also see ML algorithms applied in vulnerability, device, and security policy management, DDoS mitigation, information flow quantifications, and network infrastructure [103, 106, 116, 141] . Hence, it is reasonable to expect that more ML systems and algorithms will move upstream in more security domains. 4. Scalability: With increasing amount of data from growing numbers of information channels and devices, scale of ML-based security defenses will become a more important aspect in researching ML applications in security [12, 50, 109, 131] . As a result, large-scale systems will enable distributed graph algorithms in malware analysis, AS path hijacker tracing, cyberphysical system fault correlation, etc.. [49, 56, 72, 96, 106, 118] 5. Specialized probabilistic models will be applied beyond the context of classifiers, e.g. access control [81] . 6. High FP rates have always been a concern for system architects and algorithm researchers [86, 150] . Reducing FP rates will grow from an ad-hoc component in various system designs, to independent formal frameworks, algorithms, and system designs. 7. Privacy enforcement was framed as a learning problem recently in [158] , in the light of many publications on privacy-preservation in ML algorithms, and privacy enhancement by probabilistic models [11, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163] . This new trend will become more prominent.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed ML applications in security domains by surveying literature from top venues of our field between 2008 and early 2016. We attempted to bring clarity to a complex field with intersecting expertises by identifying common use cases, generalized system designs, common assumptions, metrics or features, and ML algorithms applied in different security domains. We constructed a matrix showing the intersections of ML paradigms and three different taxonomy structures to classify security domains, and show that while much research has been done, explorations in GT-based ML paradigms and HITL ML system designs are still much desired (and under-utilized) in the context of active attackers. We point out 7 promising areas of research based on our observations, and argue that while ML applications can be powerful in security domains, it is critical to match the ML system designs with the underlying constraints of the security applications appropriately.
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Kelley SP'12 [75] Measure password strength by simulating passwordcracking algorithms
Brute force Markov models
Gao CCS'13 [69] Attack hollow textual CAPTCHAs CNN Afroz SP'14 [77] Detect multiple identities of anonymous authors Principal component analysis(PCA), L1-regularized LR, linear SVM Ma SP'14 [73] Study of probabilistic password models Markov models and context-free grammar Chatterjee SP'15 [72] Natural language encoder design for cracking-resistant password vaults Natural language encoder(NLE) Freeman NDSS'16 [25] Probabilistic model for user authentication at login time
Probabilistic model
Gao NDSS'16 [70] Generic attack model on text-based CAPTCHAs SVM(kernel unspecified), back-propagation neural network, template matching, CNN ML-based web app anomaly detection with scarce training data Knowledge base(local and global), offline and online trained classifier HMM-encoded probabilistic grammar, agglomerative hierarchical clustering Chapman CCS'11 [92] Quantify side channel leaks from web apps Web app, web crawler, metrics and feature extraction, quantifier(classifier, entropy calculator, Fisher criterion calculator) Nearest-centroid(metrics:
Total-SourceDestination, edit distance, random distance) Sculley KDD'11 [85] Detect adversarial advertisements Model aggregation, labeled data, stratified sampling, classifier, human monitoring feedback Linear SVM and its variations Curtsinger Sec'11 [83] In-browser JS malware detection URL BL, scan scripts, code deobfuscator, feature extractor, classifier NB(metric: matched strings)
Lu CCS'11 [88] Browser [106] Detect privacy leak in data flow App information collector, data-and system-dependence graph, privacy disclosure analysis, peer voting engine Ranking based on TF/IDF and cosine similarity representing semantic similarity Xu NDSS'16(IF) [107] Generic automated evasions of malicious PDF classifiers Population initialization, mutation, variant selection, feedback to population SVM-RBF, RF [112] Recognize functions in malware binaries Binary, fixed-length subsequence extractor, learner
Recurrent neural network(RNN) with 1 hidden layer(optimized with stochastic gradient descent "SGD") Kirat CCS'15 [127] Auto-extract malware evasion behavior signature Execution event extractor, call sequence alignment, event comparison, clustering Local sequence alignment, IDF, hierarchical clustering(metric: Jaccard similarity) Smutz NDSS'16 [113] Detect malware mimicry evasions with ensemble classifiers Two malware classifiers as an ensemble, using mutual agreement analysis Ensemble: Linear SVM, RF [148] Use of n-grams in intrusion detection Anomaly detection and ML are two different schemes for IDS Reviewed n-gram models in both ML and anomaly detection schemes Momtazpour KDD'15 [153] Detect correlated invariants in cyber-physical systems Local invariants after filtering can still be correlated Latent factor auto regression with exogenous input to correlate time series Juba NDSS'15 [150] Reproducibility and comparison framework for IDS Uniform distribution approximates the entire web by Common Crawl URL index Probablistic model
